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Report X Marks the Spot:
The British Government’s Deceptive
Dossier on Iraq and WMD
ERIC HERRING
PIERS ROBINSON
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT PUBLISHED A DOSSIER on 24
September 2002 setting out its claims regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD).1 Parliament was recalled for an emergency session on
the same day to hear Prime Minister Tony Blair’s presentation of it. The
dossier stated that Iraq had WMD and was producing more. After the
invasion in March 2003, no WMD were found. Ever since, there has been
controversy as to whether the dossier reported accurately intelligence which
turned out to be wrong, as Blair has claimed consistently, or whether the
dossier deliberately deceived by intentionally giving the impression of greater
Iraqi WMD capability and threat than the intelligence suggested. Despite a
great deal of attention to the September dossier, there has not been any
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analysis conceptually well developed enough, or sufficiently grounded in the
empirical evidence, to make much headway in resolving this disagreement.
This article assesses the extent to which the dossier was part of a campaign of
organized political persuasion and whether that campaign involved demon-
strable deception. It shows that the dossier did not accurately represent the
content and strength of intelligence that turned out to bewrong. Instead, the
dossier portrayed a misleading picture of greater capability and greater
certainty than the intelligence warranted. The misleading nature of the
dossier was not an accident. There was a concerted effort by many of those
involved in producing the dossier to push the claims about the intelligence as
far as possible. The phrase “dodgy dossier”was originally used to describe this
September dossier.2 The British government published another dossier on 3
February 2003whichwas exposed as beingmostly plagiarized.3 Subsequent-
ly, the term “dodgy dossier” has tended to be applied mainly to this second
dossier. In view of the arguments in this article, the September dossier ought
to be known as the deceptive dossier.
The argument in this article is structured in four sections. The first
section surveys official claims regarding the dossier, the results of four
successive inquiries (the fifth has not yet reported), and the scholarly
literature to date. Here the article shows that, despite some discussion of
the dossier in numerous publications, there has still not been an in‐depth
analysis of its contents and productionwhich is conceptually well developed
and which draws on vital information that has become available in the last
few years. The second section sets out the conceptual framework, while the
third applies it to the empirical record. The article shows that the dossier
was fundamentally misleading about the intelligence and that deliberate
deception through omission and distortion was involved. The conclusion
considers the significance of the deceptive dossier.
CONTROVERSIES: OFFICIAL LINES, OFFICIAL INQUIRIES, AND
ACADEMIC ANALYSIS
Those directly involved in the September dossier’s production have asserted
that it was an accurate and objective document, written by the intelligence
services, and designed to inform a public demanding to know why the UK
2Brendan O’Neill, “Blair’s Dodgy Dossier,” Spiked Online, 24 September 2002, accessed at http://www.
spiked‐online.com/newsite/article/4905#.VHRA0IusWSo, 25 November 2014.
3UK Government, Iraq: Its Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception and Intimidation, 3 February 2003,
accessed at http://web.archive.org/web/20040619112534/http://www.number‐10.gov.uk/files/pdf/iraq.
pdf, 19 April 2013; Glen Rangwala, “Intelligence? The British Dossier on Iraq’s Security Infrastructure,”
Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq Discussion List, 5 February 2003, accessed at http://www.casi.org.uk/
discuss/2003/msg00457.html, 19 April 2013.
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sought action against Iraq. For example, in 2010, Blair stated that “we came
under pressure in the lead‐up to the publication of the September dossier.
We came under enormous pressure to say what it was our intelligence was
actually telling us.”4 Alastair Campbell, Blair’s Strategy and Communica-
tions Chief, emphasized the role of the dossier as a way of showing the
intelligence that had increased government concerns: “The dossier was seen
to be necessary because the Prime Minister had been growing more and
more concerned, in part because of the intelligence that he was seeing over a
period of time… it was an exercise in openness… so that they [the public]
can be informed about all the factors.”5 Campbell described Sir John
Scarlett, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) as the “per-
son, if you like, [who] had the single pen.”6 The JIC functions to direct
the key components of the intelligence services, including the Secret
Intelligence Service (SIS, also known as MI6), Security Service (MI5),
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), and the Defence
Intelligence Staff (DIS), and to communicate advice to the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet. At least to an extent, the involvement of govern-
ment officials, civil servants, and intelligence officials means that the JIC
fuzes policy and intelligence in a way that does not occur in the United
States.
A series of official investigations inBritain has, generally speaking, agreed
with these official positions. In a report published in 2003, the House of
Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee (FASC) criticized some aspects
of the dossier and the strength with which some claims were made. Howev-
er, it concluded that Campbell “did not exert or seek to exert improper
influence” on its drafting and that the claims in the dossier “were in all
probability well founded on the basis of the intelligence then available”7 In
the same year, the British government‐appointed Intelligence and Security
Committee (ISC) concluded similarly that, although the dossier should have
reported levels of uncertainty over the intelligence, no political pressure was
put on the JIC and the JIC’s impartiality was not compromised.8 The
Hutton inquiry in 2004 agreed with its predecessors that the dossier had
4Blair, public oral evidence to Chilcot Inquiry, 29 January 2010, 73, accessed at http://www.iraqinquiry.org.
uk/media/45139/20100129‐blair‐final.pdf, 1 June 2013.
5Campbell, public oral evidence to Chilcot Inquiry, 12 January 2010,morning session, 64, accessed at http://
www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/42384/20100112am‐campbell‐final.pdf, 1 June 2013
6Campbell, public oral evidence to Chilcot Inquiry, 12 January 2010, morning session, 79.
7UKHouse of CommonsForeignAffairs Select Committee (FASC),TheDecision to Go toWar in Iraq[FASC
Report], Ninth Report of Session 2002–03, volume 1, HC 813‐1, 7 July 2003, 4, accessed at http://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/813/813.pdf, 20 April 2013.
8UK Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction–Intelligence and
Assessments, Cm 5972, 31, September 2003, accessed at http://tinyurl.com/cy9ys3p, 20 April 2013.
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the full approval of the JIC,made the case against Iraq as strongly as possible
but contained onlymaterial that was consistentwith the intelligence, did not
contain material “known or believed to be false or unreliable,” and was
drafted in a proper manner.9 The Butler Report in July 2004, in contrast,
presented a somewhat more critical stance and has provided the most
thorough review to date. It concluded that the way in which the material
was presented in the dossier, and Blair’s 24 September 2002 Commons
statement introducing the dossier, could have created the impression of
greater intelligence certainty than was the case and went further than the
previous reports in calling this “a serious weakness.”10 One particular issue
that Butler examined was the role of what has become known as Report X
and how this influenced the dossier. However, while acknowledging
that Report X “resulted in a stronger assessment in the dossier in
relation to Iraqi chemical weapons production than was justified by the
available intelligence,”11 the Butler Report contradicted itself in concluding
that “judgements in the dossier went to (although not beyond) the outer
limits of the intelligence available.”12 The crucial intelligence report, Report
X, is discussed at length later on this article because it is central to our
refutation of the position that the dossier did not go beyond the assessed
intelligence. Generally speaking, by rejecting the notion that deliberate
deception played a major role, all the inquiries emphasize intelligence
failure, that is, the mistaken belief among the intelligence services that
Iraq had WMD.
The academic literature contains a wider spread of positions than the
official reports. Some of it shares their relatively benign view. James
Humphreys argues that the dossier was produced in a legitimate way
for the legitimate purpose of communicating the government’s intelli-
gence‐based view of Iraqi WMD policy.13 He makes general observations
about the endemic nature of spin making outright lies usually unnecessary
and regards the use of spin in the case of the dossier as not exceptional or
particularly problematic. As a result, his article does not tease out and
apply distinctions that this article develops in its conceptual framework
9Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Dr David Kelly C.M.G. by Lord
Hutton, [Hutton Report] House of Commons HC 247, 28 January 2004, chap. 12 para. 467(1), accessed at
http://tinyurl.com/huttoninquiry, 25 November 2014.
10Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors,
[Butler Report], House of Commons HC 898, 76, 14 July 2004, accessed at http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/
shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/14_07_04_butler.pdf, 25 November 2014.
11Ibid., 139.
12Ibid., 82.
13JamesHumphreys, “The IraqDossier and theMeaning of Spin,”ParliamentaryAffairs 58 (January 2005),
156–170, at 167.
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between informing, persuading, and deceiving. Similarly, although
Richard Aldrich concludes that omissions, misrepresentations, oversim-
plifications, and exaggerations occurred in the dossier’s presentation of the
intelligence, he does not analyze these issues extensively. Instead, he
focuses onwhat he sees as themain issue, namely the error ofmostWestern
intelligence agencies in believing that Iraq had WMD.14 Some scholars
such as Ian Davis and Andreas Persbo explain the belief that Iraq had
WMD in terms of the collective psychological phenomenon of “group-
think,” in which political actors are collectively biased toward a particular
view and interpret the available intelligence to support that view.15 Even if
this occurred, it does not address or account for the fact that those
producing the dossier knew there was a gap between what they wanted
to claim and what the intelligence said. For Anthony Glees, the publication
of intelligence to support policy on Iraq resulted in a politicization of the
intelligence so that claims of certainty were made that were not warranted
by the intelligence.16 However, he does not have much to say about this, as
his focus is on the inadvisability of publishing secret intelligence to justify
policy. Some of the academic literature emphasizes the abuse of intelli-
gence for political purposes. Alex Danchev argues that the dossier involved
deception and misrepresentation in order to make the case for war, with
Scarlett’s ownership of the dossier a sham and with Scarlett simply
doing what Campbell wanted.17 This piece is more a scathing presentation
of a particular interpretation than a detailed sorting through of competing
interpretations. Andrew Doig and Mark Phythian claim that Blair “know-
ingly exaggerated” the intelligence to make the case for war.18 In a brief
analysis, their method is to draw on Butler to show the gaps between
what Blair and the dossier claimed on the one hand and what the intelli-
gence showed on the other and to infer from those gaps deliberate
exaggeration. In contrast, this article traces the processes involved
to show directly what happened rather than merely inferring it. Glen
Rangwala and Dan Plesch wrote a booklet that made the strongest case
14Richard J. Aldrich, “Whitehall and the Iraq War: The UK’s Four Intelligence Enquiries,” Irish Studies on
International Affairs 16 (2005): 1–16.
15Ian Davis and Andreas Persbo, “After the Butler Report: Time to Take on the Group Think inWashington
and London,” BASIC Papers, 1 July 2004, accessed at http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/
PUB010704.pdf, 26 May 2013.
16Anthony Glees, “Evidence‐based Policy, or Policy‐based Evidence: Hutton and the Government’s Use of
Secret Intelligence,” Parliamentary Affairs 58 (January 2005): 138–155, at 148.
17Alex Danchev, “The Reckoning: Official Inquiries and the IraqWar,” Intelligence andNational Security 19
(Autumn 2004): 436–466.
18AndrewDoig andMarkPhythian, “TheNational Interest and the Politics of Threat Exaggeration: TheBlair
Government’s Case for War Against Iraq,” The Political Quarterly 76 (July 2005): 368–376, at 375.
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using the material then available that Blair deliberately misled the public
and Parliament.19 However, this item and all the others referred to above
were published in 2004 or 2005 in relation to the FASC, ISC, Hutton and
Butler reports. Hence theywere writtenwithout benefiting from the crucial
information which has emerged subsequently.
More recent publications have still not filled the conceptual or empirical
gap regarding the dossier. StevenKettel agreeswith thosewho see the dossier
as involving exaggeration of intelligencematerial to advance the campaign to
overthrow Saddam Hussein.20 However, he does not systematically identify
those exaggerations, and his analysis devotes only one sentence to Report X
and misses its vital importance. Although providing little detailed evidence
and analysis, John Morrison blames the intelligence services for having
“unconsciously exaggerated” Iraq’s WMD capabilities, but mainly blames
Blair for “active” misuse of the exaggerated intelligence.21 Joshua Rovner
argues that the September dossier involved the politicization of intelligence,
but, as his focus is on the United States, he examines the dossier only
briefly.22 Deploying a typology of lying, spinning, and truth‐telling, John
Mearsheimer argues that the George W. Bush administration lied—that is,
made claims that it knew or suspected were false—when it asserted that it
knew for certain that Iraq hadWMD.23 He does not apply his framework to
Britain’s handling of intelligence on Iraq other than in passing. His method
is essentially the same as that of Doig and Phythian—comparing the gap
between public certainty and private uncertainty—but Mearsheimer con-
cludes lying, whereas Doig and Phythian conclude knowing exaggeration,
and the difference between them is unclear. Brian Jones, Head of the
Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Technical Intelligence Branch of the DIS,
published an important book on British intelligence and Iraqi WMD in
2010.24 In the British intelligence system, the DIS are considered the key
experts whose task it is to evaluate and assess all incoming intelligence.25 The
subtitle of his book, published in 2010, referred to being “fooled” into war,
but in the text of the book, he concentrated on setting out what happened
19Glen Rangwala and Daniel Plesch, A Case to Answer (London: Spokesman Books, 2004).
20Steven Kettell, “Who’s Afraid of Saddam Hussein? Re‐examining the ‘September Dossier’ Affair,” Con-
temporary British History 22 (September 2008): 407–426.
21John N.L. Morrison, “British Intelligence Failures in Iraq,” Intelligence and National Security 26
(August 2011): 508–520.
22Joshua Rovner, Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2011).
23John J. Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie (Oxford University Press, 2011), 3–5, 16, 50–52.
24Brian Jones, Failing Intelligence: The True Story of How We Were Fooled into Going to War in Iraq
(London: Biteback, 2010).
25Ibid., 4.
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and the gap between what the dossier said and what the intelligence he was
aware of said. His discussion of the dossier and these interpretations is brief
and insufficient to clarify and demonstrate these claims.
In sum, the literature on the September dossier has three limitations:
it lacks a clear conceptual framework to distinguish between informing,
persuading, and deceiving; an in‐depth application of such a framework
to the production and presentation of the dossier; and an engagement
with the significant new information that has become available in the
last three years. This article provides that conceptual framework and
applies it to an in‐depth case study of the dossier using that new
information. This approach makes it possible to draw important con-
clusions about whether the dossier was part of a campaign of organized
political persuasion and whether that campaign involved deliberate
deception.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
This study, then, addresses two interrelated questions. The first concerns
whether the September dossier was an objective and accurate reflection of
the intelligence as part of an attempt to inform the British public; or,
alternatively, whether it involved a crafted presentation of the intelligence
in order to influence public opinion. In other words, is the dossier most
accurately understood as the product of organized political persuasion?
The second research question concerns the extent to which the dossier
involved intentional deception and, if so, what form that took. Organized
political persuasion and deceptive organized political persuasion are de-
fined as follows.
Organized Political Persuasion
Organized political persuasion, a phrase coined in this article, refers to a
deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions in order to gain
support for a policy. Other terms inmore common usage include propagan-
da, political marketing, public affairs, public relations, spin, information
campaign, and public relations. In military circles, commonly employed
terms are perception management, public diplomacy, strategic communi-
cation, global engagement, and psychological operations.26 All of these
26For example, John Corner, “Mediated Politics, Promotional Culture and the Idea of ‘Propaganda’,”Media,
Culture & Society 29 (July 2007): 669–677; D.H. Dearth, ‘Shaping the “Information Space,”’ Journal of
Information Warfare 1(May 2002): 1–15; Garth S. Jowett and Victoria J. O’Donnell, Propaganda and
Persuasion, 6th edn. (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 2014); DavidMiller andWilliam Dinan, A Century of Spin:
how public relations became the cutting edge of corporate power (London: Pluto Press, 2007).
BRITISH DOSSIER ON IRAQI WMD | 557
activities have two features in common: the intention to persuade people to
think in a particular way about a policy, and the existence of an organized
and systematic approach to achieving this goal. At the core of our definition
is the distinction between the communication of information understood as
only an attempt to inform, but which does not involve the intention to
persuade, and communication that is aimed at persuading an audience to
think in a particular way about an issue. Informing and persuading are
different. One might inform another person as to why one is pursuing a
particular policy, but without wishing to persuade them to support one’s
actions. The phrase “organized political persuasion” captures the essence of
the various termsmentioned above (propaganda, spin, and so on). It does so
in a clear and concise fashion while avoiding the value‐laden, context‐
specific, or euphemistic character of many of them. It also avoids necessarily
associating all acts of organized political persuasion with deception.
Deceptive Organized Political Persuasion
Our definition of organized political persuasion includes the sub‐categories
of non‐deceptive and deceptive organized political persuasion. As such,
organized political persuasionmay be conducted in a way that is honest and
non‐misleading, or it can be conducted in a way that involves deception.
With respect to Mearsheimer’s recent work on lying and deception, by
including the sub‐categories of non‐deceptive and deceptive organized
political persuasion, our notion of political persuasion spans his categories
of truth‐telling, deception, and lying.27 Identifying the point at which
organized political persuasion becomes deceptive is challenging; indeed
the tensions between truth, rhetoric, and political debate is a perennial
issue. It is also important to distinguish between attempts to simplify in
order to demonstrate the essence of a situation andmanipulation of facts in
order tomislead about the essence of a situation. Drawing upon the relevant
classic and contemporary literatures,28 there are categorizations available
that can be used to help define when organized political persuasion be-
comes deceptive. First, there is deception through lying, defined here as
making a statement that one knows or suspects to be untrue in order to
mislead. Officials and politicians know it would be very costly were they to
be exposed as having lied and so have amajor incentive to find other ways of
misleading. Second, deception can be achieved through withholding
27Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie, 15.
28Principally, Hannah Arendt, “Lying in Politics: Reflections on the Pentagon Papers,” in Crises of the
Republic (Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace, 1971), 1–47; Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie; and Thomas L.
Carson, Lying and Deception: Theory and Practice (Oxford University Press, 2012).
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information to make the viewpoint being promoted more persuasive; the
article refers to this as deception through omission (synonymous with
Mearsheimer’s category of deception through concealment). It is deceptive
because those involved know that an audience might not be persuaded if
they knew the full picture. Third, deception through distortion can also
occur. This involves framing a statement in a deliberately misleading way to
support the viewpoint being promoted. Our categories of deception
through omission and deception through distortion are equivalent to
Mearsheimer’s categories of concealment and spin respectively.29
Central to the task of assessing whether the above categories of deception
are in play is the issue of intentionality. Omissions, distortions, and the
circulation of untruths may all occur through accident, misperception, or
even self‐deception by those responsible.30 This study proceeds by estab-
lishing whether the dossier contained untruths or distortions or involved
important omissions and then assessing whether they resulted from a
deliberate intent to deceive about the essence of the situation. Of course,
establishing that the dossier wasmisleading is an easier task than establish-
ing intentionality, and due consideration is given to the possibility of self‐
deception and misperception on the part of those involved. Where
uncertainty or lack of information prevents a clear assessment regarding
intentionality, this will be noted.
THE DECEPTIVE DOSSIER
The Dossier before the Arrival of Report X: Preparing to Persuade and
Deceive, not Inform
The first problem that emerges with the official claim that the dossier was
simply an attempt to inform public understanding is the history of both the
dossier and the lead up to the IraqWar. The dossier originated in the need to
make the case to the public for British backing for U.S. plans to invade Iraq,
rather than in response to public demand for information. The policy of
removing Saddam Hussein from power had been a component of
conservative U.S. thinking throughout the 1990 s, and the terrorist attack
of 9/11 provided an opportunity for these aspirations to be realized. In the
immediate aftermath of 9/11, some in the Bush administration advocated
attacking Iraq. However, the Bush administration decided to invade
29Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie, 16–17.
30Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1984); Robert Jervis, “Understanding Beliefs,” Political Psychology 27 (Octo-
ber 2006): 641–663; Robert Trivers, Deceit and Self‐Deception: Fooling Yourself the Better to Fool Others
(Allen Lane, 2011).
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Afghanistan first. From late 2001, regime change in Iraq through military
forcewas backon the agenda.31LeakedBritishdocuments fromMarch2002
show that the British government told the U.S. government that it backed
regime change through military force; would need a strategy to sell military
action to the public, the press and Parliament by wrong‐footing Iraq on
weapons inspections; and would also need a public document to help make
the case on the basis of disarming Iraq of WMD.32 By late July, the internal
British assessment of the U.S. position was that war was inevitable.33 The
pressures facing Britain were different from those facing the United States.
Britain put much greater weight on trying to secure at least a semblance of
UN Security Council authorization in order to buttress the claim that the
war was legal. The British government also faced much greater public
opposition compared with the Bush administration, again creating great
pressure to justify any military action. This contributed to the emphasis on
imminent threat from chemical weapons rather than a potential longer‐
term threat from nuclear ones that was more of a focus in the United States.
Starting in February 2002, there were internal discussions about the
publication of declassified intelligence regarding WMD threats. A letter
dated 28 February and released in response to a Freedom of Information
(FOI) request refers to a “meeting last Tuesday,” held to “consider the
unclassified paper on [four] WMD countries of concern.”34 This is the
earliest indication of the existence of plans for the dossier, and the meeting
noted that “Iraq continues to look a bit thin.”35 References to using a dossier
to help build public support appear in a number of other documents released
due to FOI requests. For example, on 6March, a letter titled “WMD: Public
Handling” from Julian Miller, chief of the JIC assessment staff, to the U.S.
Embassy in London states that “we were preparing a draft paper for public
consumption, setting out the facts on WMD in a number of nations…[T]
here are also continuing discussions on the policy approach to handling this
31Joyce Battle, “The Iraq War – Part I: The US Prepares for Conflict, 2001,” 22 September 2010, accessed at
http://www2.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB326/, 30 May 2013; John Prados and Chris Ames,
“The Iraq War – Part II: Was There Even a Decision?” 1 October 2010, accessed at http://www2.gwu.edu/
nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB328/, 30 May 2013.
32Iraq Inquiry Digest, “The Downing Street Documents,” accessed at http://www.iraqinquirydigest.org/?
page_id¼161, 5 June 2013. See Jane M.O. Sharp, “Tony Blair Nurtures the Special Relationship,” in Jane K.
Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall, eds.,WhyDid the United States Invade Iraq (London: Routledge, 2012), 167–
200.
33Matthew Rycroft, “Iraq: Prime Minister’s meeting, 23 July,” 23 July 2002, S 195 /02, accessed at http://
downingstreetmemo.com/memos.html, 26 May 2013.
34J. Hamilton‐Eddy, “WMD Programmes of Concern,” 28 February 2002, in FOI305712, WMD Pro-
grammes of Concern, 14, accessed at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/foi‐
wmd‐iraq.pdf, 22 April 2013.
35Hamilton‐Eddy, WMD Programmes of Concern, 14.
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material in public. And it may be buffed up somewhat by the presentational
experts.”36 On 8 March 2002, the “Iraq Options Paper” from the Defence
and Overseas Secretariat in the Cabinet Office listed steps to be taken in
relation to launching an invasion of Iraq, the final one of which referred to
“sensitising the public” and the need for “a media campaign to warn of the
dangers that Saddam poses and to prepare public opinion both in the UK
and abroad.”37 A minute from Scarlett dated 15 March indicated the in-
volvement of Campbell: “Getting the presentational tone right will clearly be
a key. We will need to consider at what stage to consult Alastair Campbell.
Alastair… stands ready to advise.”38 TheButler Report, when discussing this
period, refers to “[t]he importance of presentational activity on Iraq’s
breaches to persuade othermembers of the UnitedNations Security Council
as well as domestic audiences of the case for action to enforce disarma-
ment.”39 Hence, the starting point was preparing the public for war on the
basis of an Iraqi WMD threat and with heavy emphasis on presentation. In
other words, the dossier was part of a campaign of organized political
persuasion.
A central problem with a dossier that discussed Iraq alongside North
Korea, Iran, and Libya was that the intelligence did not suggest that Iraq
was the most threatening of the four or required military action to be taken
against it and not the others. Documents released due to FOI requests show
concerns over the dossier’s weakness, the need for better presentation, and
suggestions over manipulation of material in order to increase impact.
Scarlett noted on 6 March the need to discuss whether the paper should
only cover Iraq.40 On 11 March, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw is quoted as
stating “Good, but should not Iraq be ﬁrst and also have more text? The
paper has to show why there is an exceptional threat from Iraq. It does not
quite do this yet.”41 Following this criticism, a minute from Scarlett explic-
itly proposed deception through omission on 15 March:
The Foreign Secretary felt that an earlier draft did not demonstrate why
Iraq posed a greater threat than other countries of concern. The new draft
highlights some unique features (violation of SCRs [UN Security Council
36Julian Miller, “WMD: Public Handling,” 6 March 2002, WMD Programmes of Concern, 26.
37UK Defence and Overseas Secretariat, “Iraq Options Paper,” 8 March 2002, accessed at http://down-
ingstreetmemo.com/docs/iraqoptions.pdf, 14 September 2011.
38Excerpt of minute from John Scarlett to David Manning, 15 March 2002,WMD Programmes of Concern,
27.
39Butler Report, 67.
40Minute from Scarlett to Manning, 6 March 2002, document 7, WMD Programmes of Concern, 27.
41Excerpt of minute from SimonMcDonald to Peter Ricketts, “Iraq,” 11 March 2002,WMD Programmes of
Concern, 43.
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Resolutions]; use of CW [Chemical Warfare] agents against own people).
Youmay still wish to consider whethermore impact could be achieved if the
paper only covered Iraq. This would have the benefit of obscuring the fact
that in terms of WMD, Iraq is not that exceptional.42
On the same day, Tim Dowse, head of counter‐proliferation at the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (FCO), suggested that the intelligence be pre-
sented in a way designed to prevent the public from realizing what it was
saying:
Thereafter, if it appears that we do have to change our public line, I wonder
if we might finesse the presentational difficulty by changing the terms?
Instead of talking about tonnes of precursor chemicals (which don’t mean
much to the man in the street anyway), could we focus on munitions and
refer to precursor chemicals sufficient to produce x thousand Scud war-
heads/aerial bombs/122mm rockets filled with mustard gas/the deadly
nerve agents tabun/sarin/VX?… I realise that this would not in the end
hoodwink a real expert, who would be able to reverse the calculation and
work out that our assessment of precursor quantities had fallen. But the
task would be… impossible for a layman. And the result would, I think,
have more impact on the target audience for [the] unclassified paper.43
Dowse’s proposed deception through distortion was not implemented in
the dossier but it shows again an official offering up an idea for deception.
On 19 March, a minute from Campbell confirmed that a decision had been
taken to focus only on Iraq,44 and the following week a new version was
produced along those lines.
Blair had already indicated on 17 March that that he recognized the
weakness of the intelligence regarding WMD, and he speculated over alter-
native ways of justifying action. He stated that the “immediate WMD prob-
lems don’t seemobviouslyworse than3 years ago,”before going on todescribe
how, given this situation, “we have to re‐order our story and message” and
suggesting that public presentation of Iraq policy focus on the humanitarian
and moral arguments for removing Saddam.45 A memo from Straw to Blair
dated 25March reiterated the presentational problems. Straw stated that “in
the documents so far presented it has been hard to glean whether the threat
from Iraq is so significantly different from that of Iran andNorth Korea as to
42Minute from Scarlett to Manning, 15 March 2002, document 13, WMD Programmes of Concern, 50.
43Letter from Dowse to Miller, 15 March 2002, WMD Programmes of Concern, 73.
44Minute from Campbell to Scarlett, 19 March 2002, document 14, WMD Programmes of Concern, 52.
45Memo from Blair to Powell, 17 March 2002, Chilcot Inquiry, accessed at http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/
media/50751/Blair‐to‐Powell‐17March2002‐minute.pdf, 6 April 2012.
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justify military action.”46 He then notes the problem caused by lumping Iraq
into the same category as the other countries of concern:
By linking these countries together in his ‘axis of evil’ speech, President Bush
implied an identity between them not only in terms of their threat, but also
in terms of the actionnecessary to dealwith the threat. A lot ofworkwill now
need to done to delink the three, and to show why military action against
Iraq is so much more justified than against Iran and North Korea.
With the dossier on the verge of being released in late March, it was
decided that its publication should be postponed.47 Major General Michael
Laurie was Director General Intelligence Collection in the DIS in 2002 and
had a central role in gathering intelligence for the dossier. He explained the
postponement to Chilcot in the following way:
[Air Marshall Sir] Joe French [Chief of Defence Intelligence] came back
from some JICmeeting and said, you know, that dossier which was the four
country dossier did not make a case for war and we are going to be doing
this all again and we need to collect more information. So over the summer
the pressure sort of built up and up to try to collect more.…[T]he purpose
of this thing was to make a case for war.48
As instructed, over the next few months, work on the dossier and the
strategy of publishing intelligence in order to mobilize public opinion
continued, both in Britain and the United States. Campbell met with
Scarlett on 23 April “to go through what we needed to do communications
wise to set the scene for Iraq, e.g. a WMD paper and other papers about
Saddam.”49 On 8 May, Bush commissioned the CIA White Paper that
would ultimately be published in October 2002 titled Iraq’s Weapons of
Mass Destruction Programs.50 This was the U.S. equivalent of the U.K.
dossier. On 6 June, a draft of the U.K. dossier was circulated to which was
attached a cover sheet stating “produced by CIC.”51 The CIC (Coalition
46Memo from Straw to Blair, “Crawford/Iraq,” 25March 2002, accessed at http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/
media/50151/straw‐to‐blair‐25march2002‐letter.pdf, 29 April 2013.
47Scarlett, public oral evidence to Chilcot Inquiry, 12 August 2009, 55–55, accessed at http://www.iraqin-
quiry.org.uk/media/40665/20091208pmscarlett‐final.pdf, 12 June 2013.
48Laurie, private oral evidence to Chilcot Inquiry, 3 June 2010, 6, also 11–16, 24–30, accessed at http://www.
iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/52048/Laurie‐2010‐06‐03‐S1.pdf, 15 June 2013.
49Alistair Campbell, The Blair Years (London: Random House, 2008), 618.
50John Prados and Chris Ames, “The Iraq War – Part III: Shaping the Debate,” 4 October 2010, accessed at
http://www2.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB330/, 30 May 2013; John Prados, “PR Push for Iraq
War Preceded Intelligence Findings,” 22 August 2008,National Security Archive, accessed at http://www2.
gwu.edu/nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB254/, 1 June 2013.
51Obtained by Ames via FOI request, accessed at http://www.iraqinquirydigest.org/wp‐content/uploads/
2010/09/cover‐letter‐june‐02‐cic‐draft.pdf, 22 April 2013.
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Information Centre) was run by Campbell from within the Foreign Office
as an autonomous unit which drew on staff from a range of government
departments and the governments of other countries, including the
United States. A minute from Jonathan Powell, Blair’s Chief of Staff, dated
19 July, reiterated the need to make a public case for war based on Iraqi
WMD:
We need to establish a legal base. More difficult for us than for them [the
United States]. It needs to be based on WMD rather than terrorism or
regime change.…We need tomake the case. We need a plan and a timeta-
ble for releasing papers we have prepared on human rights abuses, WMD
etc. We need to have the sort of Rolls Royce information campaign we had
at the end of Afghanistan before we start in Iraq.52
This campaign was not about informing the public about a serious WMD
threat or responding to a public clamor for information: it was about
presenting a defensible rationale for war as part of a campaign of organized
political persuasion.
As mentioned earlier, by late July, No.10 was being briefed that military
action by the United States was seen as inevitable, even though existing
intelligence on Iraq fell far short of establishing either that there was a
significant threat from Iraqi WMD, or that Iraq was in clear breach of UN
resolutions.53 So the problem that had confronted the government inMarch
was still there in August.54 The White House Information Group was
formed in August in order to coordinate a media campaign regarding Iraqi
WMD.55 Documents released in the U.K. show the continued drafting of
intelligence material as well as coordination with the United States.56 They
include an email on 9 August from aDIS official who wrote: “further to your
request to make the public papermore exciting and/or more like the slightly
iffy claims about big buildings in REDACTED please see the following.”57
52Powell minute to Blair, 19 July 2002, Chilcot Inquiry, accessed at http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/
50772/Powell‐to‐Blair‐19July2002‐minute.pdf, 6 April 2012.
53Rycroft, “Iraq.”
54For an overview from the start of September, see; Letter from Jeremy Greenstock to Michael Jay, “Iraq:
Handling in the Security Council,” 3 September 2002, accessed at http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/
52504/greenstock‐jay‐security‐council‐2002‐09‐03.pdf, 22 April 2013.
55Scott McLellan, What Happened: Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception
(New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 142.
56D.I.S. email, “Dossier – Missile Sites,” 8 August 2002, obtained by Ames via FOI request, accessed at
http://www.iraqinquirydigest.org/wp‐content/uploads/2011/04/Extract‐Pages‐From‐dis‐up‐to‐16‐setp.
pdf, 5 April 2012.
57Ibid.
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Despite the lack of good evidence of a threat, Blair announced publicly
on 3 September that a dossier would soon be published. On 4 September,
John Williams, FCO Head of Communications, wrote a minute titled
“Iraq Media Strategy” setting out the work that needed to be done:
“The media siege should now be challenged regularly by the Prime Minis-
ter and the Foreign Secretary: to reinforce the broad case, so that it strikes
a chord with more and more people, as opposed to journalists; and to
create the right environment for the dossier.” 58Williams elaborated: “The
tone of the launch will be critical…Our target is not the argumentative
interviewer or opinionated columnist, but the kind of people to whom
ministerial interviewers are a background hum on the car or kitchen
radio.” Williams indicated the weakness of the dossier in relation to
this task: “The evidence dossier is unlikely to be enough… to win the
argument… . There is no ‘killer fact’ … that ‘proves’ that Saddam must
be taken on now, or this or that weapon will be used against us.” Campbell
emailed Powell the next day to say that the dossier needed to be rewritten
substantially and that JIC Chairman Scarlett and his subordinate,
Miller, would be in charge of the dossier “as per TB’s [Tony Blair’s]
discussion.”59 As Blair made clear at the Hutton Inquiry, placing
Scarlett in charge was seen as critical: “The whole purpose of having
the JIC own this document was in order to provide the absolute clarity
and certainty… that in the end they were perfectly happy with this…[I]t
was essential that anything that we said in the course of my statement
or in the dossier we could hand on heart say: this is the assessment of
the Joint Intelligence Committee.”60 The political credibility of the dossier
was seen as being linked to it being perceived as the work of intelligence
officials. However, and despite Campbell’s claim in his diary that the
dossier “was the work of the [intelligence] agencies,”61 there were con-
tinual interactions between Scarlett, communications experts from
the FCO, and Blair’s advisers. Campbell chaired meetings on 5 and 9
September with senior officials and Scarlett regarding the dossier and
reported that his role was to provide advice on “all the presentation
58John Williams, “Iraq Media Strategy”, 4 September 2002, accessed at http://www.iraqinquirydigest.org/
wp‐content//uploads/2010/12/williams‐media‐strategy‐sep‐02.pdf, 6 April 2012.
59Email from Campbell to Powell, 5 September 2012, CAB 11/0017, accessed at http://webarchive.natio-
nalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221550/http://www.the‐hutton‐inquiry.org.uk/content/evidence/
CAB_11_0017.pdf, 1 June 2013.
60Blair, public oral evidence to Hutton Inquiry, 28 August 2003, para. 17, accessed at http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221550/http://www.the‐hutton‐inquiry.org.uk/content/transcripts/
hearing‐trans22.htm, 1 June 2013.
61Alastair Campbell, The Burden of Power: Countdown to Iraq – The Alastair Campbell Diaries, vol. 4
(London: Arrow, 2013), 589.
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aspects.”62 An interdepartmental drafting group met on 5 and 9 Septem-
ber that was chaired byMiller. Many of the individuals at the 5 September
meeting would later form part of Campbell’s Iraq Information Group of
government department media heads.63 When this group met on 9 Sep-
tember, and again on 17 September, representatives from the FCO News
Department and No.10 Press Office were present.64 Individuals involved
in finalizing the dossier includedWilliams and Paul Hammill from Camp-
bell’s CIC team.65 Scarlett confirmed on 10 September the extensive
involvement of Williams: “I attach a revised draft of the dossier… . This
has been significantly recast, with considerable help from John Williams
and others in the Foreign Office.”66 Indeed, Williams had drafted a
version of the dossier before 9 September. Hand‐written on the front of
this document are the words “JohnWilliams’s re‐draft.” Crossed out in the
header is the reference “JIC Two Document Version 24 July 2002.”67
Although the government has claimed that Williams’s September draft
was simply a document he chose to write on his own initiative, its exis-
tence, coupled with Scarlett’s confirmation regarding Williams’s involve-
ment, gives good reason to think that Scarlett’s 10 September dossier was a
version of the material that had been in production for months with
people who were not intelligence analysts playing a central role. When
questioned about the various earlier drafts and the involvement of Wil-
liams, Campbell admitted that “[o]nce we got to September 5 and
September 9, it was anything that anybody had written before, frankly,
was to be used by John Scarlett as he saw fit.”68
Throughout the final drafting process, officials were concerned to ensure
that the dossier made a persuasive case against Iraq. In an email from DIS
dated 6 September, the author writes “unless we want people picking holes
in the case presented, the specifics should either be left out or made clear. If
62Campbell, public oral evidence to Chilcot Inquiry, 12 January 2010, morning session, 76, accessed at
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/42384/20100112am‐campbell‐final.pdf, 1 June 2013.
63Campbell, public oral evidence to Hutton Inquiry, 19 August 2003, morning session, paras. 9‐10, accessed
at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221550/http://www.the‐hutton‐inquiry.org.uk/
content/transcripts/hearing‐trans12.htm, 1 June 2013.
64Scarlett, public oral evidence to Hutton Inquiry, 23 September 2003, morning session, paras. 82‐84,
accessed at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221550/http://www.the‐hutton‐inquiry.
org.uk/content/transcripts/hearing‐trans41.htm, 1 June 2013.
65Excerpt from letter from Miller, “Iraq Public Dossier,” 6 September 2002, accessed at http://www.
iraqinquirydigest.org/wp‐content/uploads/2011/07/Sept‐6‐Miller.pdf, 22 April 2013.
66Email from Scarlett to Campbell, “The Iraq Dossier,” 10 September 2002, accessed at www2.gwu.edu/
nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB330/III‐Doc10.pdf, 1 June 2013.
67
“JIC Two Document Version”, 24 July 2002, accessed at http://www.iraqinquirydigest.org/wp‐content/
uploads/2013/02/williams.pdf, 7 October 2014.
68Campbell, public oral evidence to Chilcot Inquiry, 12 January 2010, morning session, 81.
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the aim is to support the line being taken, then we need to say something
like the following.”69 On 9 September, Campbell expressed his gratitude to
the intelligence services: “The media/political judgement will inevitably
focus on ‘what’s new?’ and I was pleased to hear from you and your SIS
colleagues that, contrary to media reports today, the intelligence commu-
nity are taking such a helpful approach to this in going through all the
material they have. It goes without saying that there should be nothing
published that you and they are not 100% happy with.”70 Campbell told
Scarlett that the dossier had to be “revelatory and we needed to show that it
was new and informative and part of a bigger case.”71 It was during this
period that vague intelligence, including about the ability to launch WMD
within 45 minutes and about mobile biological production facilities, was
received, and then used in the 9 September JIC assessment and the 10
September draft of the dossier.When the 9 and 10 September dossier drafts
were circulated, however, there was still widespread concern that they were
insufficiently persuasive. One official wrote that “much of the evidence we
have is largely circumstantial so we need to convey to our readers that the
accumulation of these facts demonstrates an intent on Saddam’s part—the
more they can be led to this conclusion themselves rather than have to
accept judgements from us, the better.”72Another official wrote, “Very long
way to go, I think we’re in a lot of trouble with this as it stands now.”73 An
email dated 11 September states that “No. 10 through the Chairman want
the document to be as strong as possible within the bounds of the available
intelligence. This is therefore a last call for any items of intelligence that
agencies think can and should be included.”74 On the same day, in aminute
to Scarlett, Desmond Bowen, Deputy Head of the Overseas and Defence
Secretariat in the Cabinet Office, wrote:
In looking at the WMD sections, you clearly want to be as firm and
authoritative as you can be. You will need to judge the extent to which
69D.I.S. email, 6 September 2002, obtained by Ames via FOI request, accessed at http://www.iraqinquir-
ydigest.org/wp‐content/uploads/2011/04/Extract‐Pages‐From‐dis‐up‐to‐16‐setp.pdf, 5 April 2012.
70Memo fromCampbell to Powell,Manning,Williams andOmand, 9 September 2002, CAB/6/0002‐0004,
accessed at www2.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB330/III‐Doc07.pdf, 1 June 2013.
71Campbell, Blair Years, 634.
72Email fromDaniel Pruce toMarkMatthews, 10 September 2002, CAB/11/0021, accessed at http://www2.
gwu.edu/nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB330/III‐Doc09.pdf, 1 June 2013.
73Email from Philip Bassett to Daniel Pruce and Alistair Campbell, 11 September 2002, CAB/11/0025,
accessed at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221550/http://www.the‐hutton‐inquiry.
org.uk/content/evidence/CAB_11_0025.pdf, 1 June 2013.
74Email [unidentified official], “Iraq Dossier‐Questions fromNo. 10,” 11 September 2002,Hutton Inquiry,
CAB/23/0015, accessed at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221550/http://www.the‐
hutton‐inquiry.org.uk/content/evidence/CAB_23_0015.pdf, 1 June 2013.
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you need to hedge your judgments with, for example, “it is almost certain”’
and similar caveats. I appreciate that this can increase the authenticity of the
document in terms of it being a proper assessment, but that needs to be
weighed against the use that will be made by opponents of action who will
add up the number of judgments onwhichwe do not have absolute clarity.75
The end result of this process was that the dossier presented a strengthened
impression of the threat from Iraq and of the certainty of the intelligence.
The Butler Report put it this way:
[I]n translating material from JIC assessments into the dossier, warnings
were lost about the limited intelligence base on which some aspects of these
assessments were beingmade.…Language in the dossiermay have left with
readers the impression that there was fuller and firmer intelligence behind
the judgements than was the case.76
At this point, then, preliminary conclusions can be reached regarding the
two research questions in relation to the dossier, from its conception in
February 2002. On the first research question, the dossier was not a
straightforward reflection of the intelligence authored by the “single pen”
of Scarlett and intended to inform in response to public demand. Instead,
the dossier was conceived and drafted in order to serve a campaign of
organized political persuasion. This is demonstrated by its initiation in
relation to justifying British backing formilitary action against Iraq and the
interactions between intelligence staff, politicians, and communications
staff. The aim was to persuade the public, the media, Parliament, and the
UNSecurity Council that Iraqwas a currentWMD threat in order to bolster
the case for war. On the second research question, the processes surround-
ing the drafting of the dossier show that this campaign of organized political
persuasion was a deceptive one through intentional distortion and omis-
sion. This can be seen in the advice to focus the dossier on Iraq to obscure
the fact that Iraq was not an exceptional WMD threat, the repeated
admissions that the intelligence did not make a strong case for military
action, the drive to remove caveats and qualifications, and the search for
excitingmaterial to include. No one is on record at the time or subsequently
as saying that the efforts to strengthen the claims in the dossier resulted
from the view that the various drafts had underplayed the certainty or
alarming nature of the intelligence. There is also no evidence of groupthink
75Minute from Bowen to Scarlett, copied to Campbell, Powell and Manning, “Iraq Dossier,” 11 Septem-
ber 2002, document 7, obtained by Ames via FOI request, accessed at http://www.iraqinquirydigest.org/wp‐
content/uploads/2013/02/info.pdf, 21 April 2013.
76Butler Report, 114.
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in which there was collective self‐deception or misperception that the
intelligence was certain or alarming. Instead, the evidence demonstrates
that all of those leading its production understood the gulf between the
overall picture that they wanted to portray and what the intelligence
actually demonstrated. The alternative was to admit that the intelligence
did not show that Iraq was particularly threatening and to argue, never-
theless, that military action should be taken in case the threat worsened in
the future. However, they could not do that, as it was clear that it would not
be persuasive politically, nevermind defensible legally. The deceptive claims
were pushed furthest due to Report X as the article now explains.
The Gap Between the Dossier and the Intelligence Widens:
Report X Marks the Spot
On 10 September, Sir Richard Dearlove, the Chief of the SIS, alerted
Scarlett to the imminent arrival of an intelligence report subsequently
named Report X by Brian Jones, then Head of the Nuclear, Biological,
Chemical Technical Intelligence Branch of the DIS. The informant was
described at the time as a “new source on trial”. The report arrived the
following day.77 Scarlett told Chilcot: “the compartmented intelligence,
which was influential, which came in on 11 September, did famously
influence what was said in the dossier.”78 Considering its importance,
this fact is not nearly as famous as it should be and there is a need to
understand exactly how it influenced the dossier. Throughout 2002 the
intelligence had never been sufficient to permit a confident JIC judgment
that Iraq was actually producing chemical and biological agents nevermind
putting them into warheads and bombs. Although the details of Report X
remain secret, the Butler Report indicates that it claimed the “production of
biological and chemical agent had been accelerated by the Iraqi Govern-
ment, including through the building of further facilities throughout
Iraq.”79 As far as can be ascertained, Report X contained at most very little
and possibly no specific evidence of chemical and biological agent produc-
tion. Instead, it was mainly a promise that evidence would soon be provid-
ed. The Butler Report stated that there were “well‐founded hopes that this
source would become a major asset. In particular, the source had indicated
that he would be able to provide substantial and critical additional
77Jones, Failing Intelligence, 83; Butler Report, 138‐139; Lyne in SIS4, private oral evidence to Chilcot
Inquiry, Part 1, no date [between 2009 and 2011], 58, accessed at http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/
50700/SIS4‐part‐1.pdf, 29 May 2013.
78Scarlett, oral private evidence with Miller to Chilcot Inquiry, 5 May 2010, 20, accessed at http://www.
iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/50444/ScarlettandMiller‐2010‐05‐05.pdf, 1 June 2013.
79Butler Report, 75.
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intelligence in the near future.”80 Other evidence has also emphasized the
weak nature of Report X. SIS1 stated: “Here was a chap who promised the
crock of gold at the end of the rainbow.”81 During SIS4’s hearings, Chilcot
inquiry member Sir Roderic Lyne stated that SIS was hoping to obtain
additional evidence promised in Report X in three or four weeks.82 Finally,
the footnote summarizing a redacted section of SIS4’s testimony provides a
concise overview of Report X and its potential value:
The witness described the background to, and political impact of, an
important piece of intelligence about Iraqi production of chemical and
biological agent, received in mid‐September 2002 from a new source on
trial. SIS believed that further material on possible WMD sites might
follow. The witness explained, therefore, that given the situation the lead
was pursued because it might provide a ‘silver bullet’.83
Ultimately, of course, the source failed to deliver in the following sixmonths
leading up to the invasion, and it was repudiated in July 2003.84
Despite being unassessed, thin and passed on from a subsource (i.e. a
person gave the information to the source who then passed it to MI6),
Report X was rushed to the top and seized upon with high hopes. On 12
September, Dearlove with one other SIS official briefed Blair about it in the
presence of Blair’s advisers Campbell, Powell, and Manning. He described
the source on trial as “developmental” and “unproven.”85 Scarlett charac-
terized Report X in his testimony to Chilcot as follows: “We were told that
this [Report X]was important, potentially important reporting, but a new
source, with a little bit more about the nature of access of the subsource, but
a very limited amount, not really possible to make—much of it.”86 Com-
menting on why a piece of raw, untested intelligence should be so rapidly
communicated to the PrimeMinister, anMI6 officer, SIS4, said, “the Prime
Minister was interested in a silver bullet. If there was a gleam of a silver
bullet anywhere, he wanted to see it.”87 The excitement about the report was
related to the attempt to getUNSecurity Council support for action on Iraq.
Blair seems to have been taken with Report X. At the Chilcot Inquiry, Lyne
80Ibid., 138.
81SIS1, private oral evidence to Chilcot Inquiry, 18, accessed at http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/
52549/sisi1‐declassified.pdf, 1 June 2013.
82SIS4, Chilcot Inquiry, 66.
83SIS4, Chilcot Inquiry, 52–54, footnote.
84Ibid., 138; Lyne in SIS1, private oral evidence to Chilcot Inquiry, 2010, 18, 1 June 2013; Lyne in SIS4,
private oral evidence to Chilcot Inquiry, Part 1, 67; see also 52–54 footnote and 66.
85Butler Report, 139.
86Scarlett, private oral evidence with Miller to Chilcot Inquiry, 5 May 2010, 31.
87SIS4, private oral evidence to Chilcot Inquiry, Part 1, 59.
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stated that “it clearly had an impact at the political level.”88 In testimony to
Chilcot, SIS1 confirmed its impact upon Blair: “It goes in our system right
up to the top policy making levels and to the PM indeed.”89 SIS1 also
underlined the point that Report X “influenced expectation on the part of
people who were concerned” that they were on the right track.90 When
pressed as to whether he thought there should have been concern over how
much excitement the reportmight cause inNo.10, SIS4was reticent: “What
I divine to be the direction of questioning is the issue of whether the Chief
detonated a psychotropic line of thinking and excitement in the Prime
Minister by giving him what in quieter days might be thought rather
precipitate briefing on casework which turned out not to be real. I don’t
think it is for me to offer a judgement on that.”91 Although this was an
inconclusive exchange, it illustrates the fact that the Chilcot panel and SIS4
understood the possible significance of Report Xwith respect to Blair.With
senior officials armedwith the promise of a silver bullet, Report X had three
major impacts on the dossier that have not been widely understood. These
were in relation to the judgment that Iraq was actively producing chemical
and biological agents, stifling dissent over the claim that Iraq had WMD
that could be launched within 45 minutes, and the strength of Blair’s
“beyond doubt” claim in the Foreword to the dossier.
“Underpinning” the Dossier Judgment that Iraq Was Producing Chemical
and Biological Agents. Report X was used to increase the certainty of the
claim that Iraq was continuing to produce chemical and biological weapons
agents. Prior to the arrival of Report X, the 9 September JIC assessment
referred to intelligence which only “indicates that: production of chemical
and biological weapons is taking place.”92 The 10/11 September draft of the
dossier executive summary said: “Our judgement, based on all the available
sources is that Iraq: has stocks of chemical and biological agents and
weapons available, both retained from before the Gulf War, and probably
from more recent production.”93 Following the arrival of Report X and
Dearlove’s briefing of Blair on 12 September regarding Report X, the
88Ibid., 52.
89SIS1, private oral evidence to Chilcot Inquiry, 19.
90Ibid.
91SIS4, private oral evidence to Chilcot Inquiry, Part 1, 61.
92JIC Assessment,“Iraqi Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons – Possible Scenarios,” 9 September 2002,
accessed at http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/50473/JICAssessment‐9September2002.pdf, 21
April 2013.
93UK Government, WMD dossier draft 10/11 September 2002, Executive Summary, 5, DOS/2/0002,
accessed at www2.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB330/III‐Doc11.pdf, 30 May 2013.
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dossier claim regarding continued production was strengthened, claiming
that production was judged, and not just “indicated” to be continuing and
with “probably” removed. In the precise language of intelligence reports, the
greater strength of the word “judged” over “indicating” is well understood.
The 16 September version now said: “Intelligence… allows us to judge that
Iraq: has continued to produce chemical and biological agents.”94 This
stands out as the first in a list of thirteen bullet points in the executive
summary (the second was the 45 minute claim, which is discussed next).
Report X was the basis for these changes. Regarding chemical agent
production, Scarlett told Hutton that Report X, which he referred to as
“compartmented intelligence” not available to DIS staff, was “underpinning
the judgement” with respect to CW agent production.95 Regarding biologi-
cal agent production, Scarlett does not explicitly state that Report X was
also underpinning this aspect of the judgment. However, the report was the
only new piece of intelligence that had become available after the 9 Sep-
tember JIC assessment and which could have been used as the basis to
justify strengthening the dossier judgment that biological agent production
was continuing. Of course, it is also possible that senior officials decided to
revisit earlier intelligence that had been used for the 9 September JIC
assessment, and then “strengthened” their interpretation of it, over and
above that of the existing JIC assessment, in order to underpin the biologi-
cal agent claim. However, the Butler Report does state that Report X
“provided significant assurance to those drafting the government’s dossier
that active, current production of chemical and biological agent (emphasis
added) was taking place.”96 The Butler Report also states that Report X
“played a major role for the JIC in confirming previous intelligence reports
that Iraq was producing chemical and biological weapons (emphasis
added).”97 Hence, even if senior officials were also revisiting earlier intelli-
gence in order to justify their strengthening of the biological agent claim,
the Butler Report confirms that Report X was influential regarding this
claim. As Chris Ames has pointed out, the strengthening of the dossier
claim regarding continued production occurred even though the formal JIC
assessments did not get strengthened, and the subsequent 28 October JIC
94UK Government, WMD dossier draft 16 September 2002, Executive Summary, 3, CAB/11/0141‐0143,
accessed at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221546/http://www.the‐hutton‐inquiry.
org.uk/content/cab/cab_11_0141to0143.pdf, 30 May 2013.
95Scarlett, public oral evidence to Hutton Inquiry, 23 September 2003, afternoon session, paras. 109–110,
accessed at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221546/http://www.the‐hutton‐inquiry.
org.uk/content/transcripts/hearing‐trans42.htm, 1 June 2013.
96Butler Report, 100–101.
97Ibid. 111. See also 100.
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assessment only used the weaker term “indicates” with respect to both
chemical and biological agent production.98 Report X did not strengthen
the formal JIC assessment; it was used only to add certainty to the dossier.
Another significant change between the 9 September JIC assessment and
the 16 September dossier draft concerned the judgment that Iraq possessed
mobile biological weapons facilities. Here, the dossier claim was hardened
from only “indicating”99 possession of mobile biological facilities, which
accurately reflected the 9 September JIC assessment,100 to one that
“judged”, 101 there to be possession. It is not clear on what basis this change
was justified, inasmuch as there was no new intelligence onmobile facilities
following the 9 September JIC assessment. This raises the issue of whether
senior officials revisited existing intelligence and then chose to override
existing JIC assessments; this matter will be returned to in the conclusion.
Where the responsibility lies for the decision to use Report X in the
dossier in order to harden the continued production claim is unclear. The
Butler Report implicates all of the senior officials, but without naming
names other than that of the PrimeMinister. After stating that the failure to
showReport X toDIS analysts had resulted “in a stronger assessment in the
dossier in relation to Iraqi chemical weapons production than was justified
by the available intelligence,” 102 it says:
As it happened, the Chief of SIS had a meeting with the PM on 12
September…He told us that he underlined to the Prime Minister the
potential importance of the new source and what SIS understood his access
to be; but also said that the case was developmental and that the source
remained unproven. Nevertheless, it may be that, in the context of the
intense interest at that moment in the status of Iraq’s prohibited weapons
programmes, and in particular continuing work on the dossier, this con-
currence of events caused more weight to be given to this unvalidated
source than would normally have been the case.103
Blair and Scarlett do not appear to have ever been asked by the Chilcot
Inquiry about the decision to use Report X. This is extraordinary, consid-
ering its importance and the fact that the Chilcot panel are on record as
98Butler Report, 87–88.
99UK Government, WMD dossier draft 10/11 September 2002, Executive Summary, 5, DOS/2/0002,
accessed at www2.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB330/III‐Doc11.pdf, 30 May 2013.
100JIC Assessment, “Iraqi Use of C.B.W.”
101UK Government, WMD dossier draft 16 September 2002, Executive Summary, 3, CAB/11/0141‐0143,
accessed at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221546/http://www.the‐hutton‐inquiry.
org.uk/content/cab/cab_11_0141to0143.pdf, 30 May 2013.
102Butler Report, 139.
103Butler Report, 139.
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quoted above as understanding its importance. During his Chilcot hearing,
Dearlove was unequivocal that he had insisted that material fromReport X
could not be published in the dossier because it had not been assessed. He
was also unequivocal that it was not used:
I can say very authoritatively that there was no material in the dossier
[fromReport X]… if you actually look at the introduction to the dossier, it
refers to assessed intelligence, specifically assessed intelligence… . [Report
X] was not assessed intelligence, and therefore are [sic] actually authori-
tatively excluded because [it does not] fall into that category, and I had put
my foot down and said this material could not be used.104
However, in his testimony to Hutton, Campbell stated that at the 12
Septembermeeting, Dearlove allowed Report X to influence the contents of
the dossier: “Andwhat C, the head of SIS said, was there was somematerial
in there which could be used through what he called ‘through assertion”’.105
It seems that Dearlove prevented the details of Report X from being
published in the dossier to protect the source on trial. However, as indicated
by Campbell’s statement, he did allow assertions to be made in the dossier
that were based on Report X. Used in this fashion, then, Report X was used
to assert in the dossier that Iraq was continuing to produce chemical and
biological agents.
Stiﬂing dissent over the 45 minute claim. Report X was vital to stifling
dissent in DIS regarding the claim that Iraq could launch WMD within 45
minutes of the order being given. Of three lines of intelligence emerging in
early September separately from Report X, the weakest concerned the 45
minute claim. Although received from an established source, it was sub‐
sourced and deemed unreliable in 2004.106 The report containing the 45
minute claim was vague107 and that claim warranted little prominence in
the JIC assessment of 9 September. Despite this, it ended up as the second
judgment in the executive summary of the dossier and was highlighted in
Blair’s Foreword and his 24 September statement to the Commons.
Throughout the drafting of the dossier, objections had been raised by
DIS staff over the strength of the wording attached to the 45 minute claim.
Jones quotes one of his colleagues as follows: “I have beenmaking this point
104Dearlove, private oral evidence to Chilcot Inquiry, 16 June 2010, 56, accessed at http://www.iraqinquiry.
org.uk/media/50694/20100616‐Dearlove.pdf, 29 May 2013.
105Campbell, public oral evidence to Hutton Inquiry, 19 August 2003, morning session, para. 41, accessed at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221546/http://www.the‐hutton‐inquiry.org.uk/con-
tent/transcripts/hearing‐trans12.htm, 8 October 2014.
106Jones, Failing Intelligence, 82.
107Ibid., 127.
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in comments on every draft of the dossier… but we are just being ig-
nored.”108 Also, and as with the continued production claim, the charac-
terization of the 45 minute claim as a judgment reflected a strengthened
claim in comparison with the 9 September JIC assessment, which referred
to intelligence as only “indicating” that WMD could be fired on that
timescale.109 At the 17 September drafting meeting, DIS analysts chal-
lenged the prominence of the 45 minute claim as a judgment and restated
the fact that there was no firm evidence that Iraq was producing, or even
had available, chemical weapons.110 Scarlett acknowledges that DIS ana-
lysts had challenged the strength of the wording attached to the 45 minute
claim as well as its status as a judgment in the dossier.111 According to
Scarlett, the objections raised were resolved as follows: “As I now know, and
we did not at the time, the matter was discussed with the DIS at a meeting
chaired by Tony Cragg [Deputy Chief of the DIS] on the afternoon of 17
September when it was decided not to pursue the point raised by DIS any
further.”112 In fact, Cragg, also a JIC member, over‐ruled DIS analysts with
a claim from SIS that new intelligence had arrived which was so sensitive
that DIS staff could not see it and which supported the firm judgment now
being made regarding the 45 minute and continued production claims.
Faced with this, DIS analysts withdrew their objections, although Jones felt
compelled to place his concerns in writing on 19 and 20 September.113 At
Chilcot in 2010, Scarlett claimed that he had agreed that it would be
necessary to show the DIS managers the compartmented report and, as
far as he was concerned, that had happened.114 However, it is not clear why
Report X was not shown to the DIS analysts. The Butler Report states: “We
have not been presented with any evidence that persuades us that there was
an insuperable obstacle to allowing expert‐level DIS access.”115 Considering
the fact that it was material that Campbell, Powell, and Manning were all
permitted to hear about, it may be that the experts were not shown Report
X because they would have inconveniently dismissed it as too thin to
support any claims, whether directly or through assertion. However, we
do not have the evidence to demonstrate that. What can be said with
108Ibid., 82.
109JIC Assessment, “Iraqi Use of CBW.”
110Jones, Failing Intelligence, 83.
111Scarlett, public oral evidence to Hutton Inquiry, 26 August 2003, morning session, paras. 77–78, accessed
at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221550/http://www.the‐hutton‐inquiry.org.uk/
content/transcripts/hearing‐trans18.htm, 1 June 2013.
112Scarlett, public oral evidence to Hutton Inquiry, 23 September 2003, morning session, para. 100.
113Jones, Failing Intelligence, 91–92.
114Scarlett, oral private evidence with Miller to Chilcot Inquiry, 5 May 2010, 47.
115Butler Report, 139.
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confidence is that Report X was used to overrule objections to the strength
of the 45 minute and the continued production claims.
Reinforcing Blair’s “Beyond Doubt” Claim in the Dossier Foreword:
With the dossier executive summary now presenting a more certain judg-
ment that Iraq was continuing to produce chemical and biological agents,
Blair, in his own foreword to the dossier, proceeded to assert the following:
“What I believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is
that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weap-
ons.”116 What justified his remarkably strong claim that the intelligence
was actually ‘beyond doubt’? When questioned at Chilcot, Blair referred to
an earlier JIC report and the dossier executive summary in order to support
his “beyond doubt” assertion, but in amisleading and inaccurate way. First,
he stated: “if I had taken… the words out of… the 9 March 2002 or the
March 2002 JIC assessment, it said, ‘It was clear that’ …Now, if I said, ‘It
was clear that’ in the foreword, rather than ‘I believe, beyond doubt’, it
would have had the same impact.”117 Here Blair implies that the JIC
assessment stated that “it was clear that Iraq was continuing to produce
chemical and biological weapons.” Blair’s claim makes no sense: if clear
confirmation of continued production had been contained in any JIC
assessment, there would have been much less excitement about Report X
and no need for it to be used to underpin the continued production claim,
which Scarlett said it did. While the 9 March JIC assessment is not
available, the 15 March one is and it says “It is clear that Iraq continues
to pursue a policy of acquiring WMD.”118 Of course, pursuing a policy of
acquiring is not the same as continuing to produce. Second, Blair stated:
if you just take the executive summary… this executive summary wasn’t
drawn up by me. It was drawn up the Joint Intelligence Committee and
they did it perfectly justifiably on the information they had before them. It
is hard to come to any other conclusion than that this person has a
continuing WMD programme.119
Here Blair gives the impression that the executive summary underpins
his continuing production “beyond doubt” claim, when actually he refers, at
the end of his response, to a “continuing WMD programme.” Again, a
continuing WMD program is not the same as continuing production. In
116Prime Minister’s Foreword, UK Government, Iraq’s WMD, 3.
117Blair, public oral evidence to Chilcot Inquiry, 29 January 2010, 81.
118JIC Assessment, “The Status of Iraqi WMD Programmes,” 15 March September 2002, accessed at http://
www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/50476/JICAssessment‐15March2002.pdf, 23 April 2013.
119Blair, public oral evidence to Chilcot Inquiry, 29 January 2010, 81.
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both instances, then, Blair’s answer misleads. He gives the impression that
the JIC’s intelligence underpins his claim that continued production is
beyond doubt by first referring inaccurately to an earlier JIC statement that
has nothing to do with continued production, and then refers to the
executive summary while simultaneously shifting the subject of his answer
away from continued production and onto continued programs. Whether
or not these inaccuracies were intentional or simply a matter of misunder-
standing and confusion is not possible to determine. Either way, Blair did
not provide a clear explanation for his “beyond doubt” claim. In the absence
of a clear answer from Blair, logic dictates that there were only two sources
upon which he could have drawn in order to make such a statement. The
first was the dossier, where it was judged that Iraq had continued to
produce chemical and biological agents; this judgment was underpinned
by Report X. The second source was Report X itself. No other sources of
intelligence were mentioned that could have given Blair reason to make
such a bald statement. In either case, Report X underpins the “beyond
doubt” claim in the Foreword. Moreover, in either case, the statement by
Blair is demonstrably untrue. If Blair’s claim rested upon the dossier, it was
clearly inaccurate, because an intelligence judgment does not imply cer-
tainty but only a balance of probabilities. Alternatively, if Blair’s “beyond
doubt” claim rested upon Report X itself, this again was demonstrably
untrue, as Report X was at most little more the promise of confirmation at
some point in the future of continued production. Sir John Chilcot was
correct to say recently that Blair’s “beyond doubt” claimwas “not possible to
make on the basis of intelligence.”120
Report X and the Continued Production Claim: Intentional Deception
Through Distortion. Returning to the central question of intentional de-
ception, what can be inferred here? First, in general terms and with respect
to the preliminary conclusions the article set out earlier, deception through
omission and deception through distortion were both involved in the
preparation of the dossier. The aim was to create a stronger impression
of an Iraqi WMD threat than would have been possible with a fair and
balanced presentation of the intelligence, in order to be as persuasive as
possible. Report Xwas used in a way that made the gap between the dossier
and the intelligence substantial. Report X was not properly assessed, was
from a source on trial, and was little more than a promise of substantial
120Quoted in Richard Norton‐Taylor, “Chilcot Report into Iraq Delayed by Whitehall Refusal to Release
Evidence,” The Guardian 16 July 2012, accessed at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/jul/16/chilcot‐
report‐iraq‐delayed‐evidence, 1 June 2013.
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intelligence. Nevertheless, it underpinned a series of powerful and promi-
nent claims regarding continued production, the ability to launchwithin 45
minutes andBlair’s “beyond doubt” claim. In short, Report X resulted in the
final version of the dossier being highly misleading.
The next question is whether the way in which Report X was used
constituted deliberate deception and, if so, what kind of deception it
was. First, despite its flimsy nature, Report X was used to strengthen the
key dossier claim that Iraqi production of chemical and biological agents
was judged to be active. In doing so, the dossier judgment on continued
production, as the Butler Report agreed, went beyond what could be
justified by the available intelligence. In a nutshell, the use of Report X
resulted in distortion through exaggeration of the current intelligence on
continued production. At best, the strengthening of the judgment rested on
a wing and a prayer that the further intelligence would indeed be forth-
coming. Second, Blair’s “beyond doubt” claim would only be sustainable if
the intelligence promised in Report X had actually turned up, which it had
not, and never did. In the case of the dossier judgment, the evidence shows
that top officials (including Blair, Dearlove, Campbell, Scarlett, and Man-
ning) were all aware of the nature of Report X, and that all were party to the
process by which Report X was used to strengthen the dossier judgment on
continued production. There is no evidence to suggest that any of those
involved misunderstood Report X. It seems that they hoped or expected
that the promised intelligence upon which the strengthened judgment
rested was indeed the “silver bullet.” The use of Report X was deception
through distortion in that those involved knew that the strength of the
claims regarding continued production exceeded the strength of the intel-
ligence. It was also deception through omission, in that no attempt was
made to admit to the remarkable weakness of the intelligence that had come
to underpin the leading dossier claims. There might have been self‐decep-
tion about the likelihood that the intelligence would come good, but the
individuals involved were deceptive about the strength of the intelligence
that they possessed at the time. They gambled that deceptionwould become
vindication. Even if they felt that they were justified in taking the risk, it was
still deception. Hence the use of Report X fits the category of intentional
deception through both distortion and omission.
Whether Blair’s “beyond doubt” statement was a case of deception
through distortion, however, is not clear‐cut. His qualification that he
“believed” the intelligencewas beyond doubt is important here. It is certainly
not possible to infer from an intelligence judgment that something is beyond
doubt. Indeed, a judgment acknowledges a level of uncertainty. In this sense,
the “beyond doubt” claim is inaccurate. At the same time, one cannot rule
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out that Blair had deceived himself into believing that Report X would
deliver. It may be that when Blair made this claim, he was fully aware that
intelligence did not support his certainty over WMD. If this was the case,
then, Blair’s claim was certainly one of deception through distortion, and, if
he knew that what he was saying was not true, deception through lying.
Indeed, in 2007 Butler claimed that while Blair was sincere about believing
that Iraq hadWMD and was seeking more, Blair was “disingenuous” about
the fact that the intelligence did not prove this conclusively.121 However, it is
also possible that self‐deception occurred. Under great pressure to persuade
public, international, and UN opinion over the threat posed by Iraq, Blair
might have simply deceived himself into believing that the “silver bullet”
promised in Report X was beyond doubt. As such, at this point, there is no
evidence available to decide whether the “beyond doubt” claim emerged due
to intentional deception through lying, or due to self‐deception.
CONCLUSIONS
In stark contrast to the claims by Blair and Campbell set out at the start of
the paper, the dossier published in September 2002 was not an accurate
reflection of the available intelligence penned by the intelligence services,
designed only to inform public understanding. The dossier presented, in
quite dramatic terms, the claims that Iraq was actively producing WMD,
that they could be launched within 45minutes of an order to do so, and that
the intelligence was “beyond doubt”. In his 24 September Commons state-
ment Blair emphasized the drama and repeated this certainty over contin-
ued production:
His WMD programme is active, detailed and growing… It [the dossier]
concludes that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, that Saddam has
continued to produce them…On chemical weapons, the dossier shows that
Iraq continues to produce chemical agent for chemical weapons… In re-
spect of biological weapons, again production of biological agents has
continued.122
None of these statements accurately reflected the available intelligence.
That the dossier ended up presenting such an inaccurate picture was not
due to errors in the drafting process, but because it was the core component
121Lord Butler, “Iraq,”House of Lords,Hansard (22 February 2007), column 1231, accessed at http://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldhansrd/text/70222‐0009.htm#07022239000740, 10
April 2013.
122Tony Blair, Statement by the Prime Minister, “Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Hansard, 24
September 2002, accessed at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/
vo020924/debtext/20924‐01.htm, 1 June 2013.
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of a campaign of deceptive organized political persuasion which involved
communications officials working closely with politicians and intelligence
officials. As documented here, this campaign involved presenting the intel-
ligence on Iraqi WMD in such threatening terms that it would serve to
persuade and mobilize support. Hence, distortion of the intelligence was
intentional. Contrary to the findings of the official inquiries to date, this
study shows that the campaign involved deceptive organized political
persuasion in which deception through distortion and omission occurred.
A prominent example of a strategy of deception through omission was the
recommendation in Scarlett’s minute to policy makers that the dossier
exclude other countries of WMD concern so as to “obscure” the fact that
Iraq was not an exceptional WMD threat. However, by far the most
significant evidence of deliberate deception came with the decision to use
Report X—little more than a promise of evidence from a source on trial—in
order to declare with greater certainty that Iraq was actively producing
chemical and biological agents. At best, the strengthening of the judgment
rested on hope that the further intelligence would indeed be forthcoming.
Hence intentional deception through distortion and omission had oc-
curred. Blair’s over‐claim regarding the intelligence being “beyond doubt”
was demonstrably untrue. However, it was not possible, on the basis of the
existing information available, to adjudicate as to whether this was inten-
tional deception through lying or self‐deception on the part of Blair.
These findings both substantiate and clarify the various claims that have
been advanced, set out in the literature review, regarding deception on the
part of the British government. In particular, the findings resolve the
inconsistency in the Butler Report in which it was noted that the use of
Report X led to an untenable claim regarding continued production, whilst
also stating the dossier did not go beyond the outer limits of the intelligence.
The dossier did go beyond the limits of the intelligence by judging that Iraq
was actively producing chemical and biological agents based only upon an
inadequately assessed piece of intelligence, from a source on trial and
mainly promising evidence at a future date. Indeed, it is remarkable that
the inquiries to date, including the ongoing Chilcot Inquiry, have failed to
examine seriously the importance of Report X and how it was used in the
dossier. That the Chilcot hearings have failed to question Blair with respect
to the decision to use this intelligence is a profound shortcoming. More
generally, the findings here support those scholars, discussed in the litera-
ture review, and officials who have commented critically with regard to the
honesty of the UK government and its intelligence‐related claims in the
dossier. Regarding officials, for example, Butler’s 2007 claim that Blair was
disingenuous about the certainty surrounding the intelligence is consistent
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with much of the evidence presented here, although we concluded that
Blair’s “beyond doubt” claim might be explicable through self‐deception
rather than intentional deception.Writing to the Chilcot inquiry in order to
refute the assertion by Campbell that the dossier was not intended to make
a case for war,Major GeneralMichael Laurie (Director General Intelligence
Collection) has stated that “During the drafting of the final dossier, every
fact was managed to make it as strong as possible, the final statements
reaching beyond the conclusions intelligence assessments would normally
draw from such facts. It was clear to me that there was direction and
pressure being applied to the JIC and its drafters.”123 The findings of
political involvement and deliberate exaggeration of intelligence in this
paper are consistent with Laurie’s statement. Our findings are also consis-
tent with the claims of Carne Ross, First Secretary in the UK Permanent
Mission to the UN from 1997 to June 2002. In his written submission to
Chilcot, he stated that the government’s public statements “intentionally
and substantially” exaggerated the capabilities indicated in its internal
assessments of Iraq’s WMD.124 Our article shows precisely how and where
intentional exaggeration occurred.
The findings here raise an important question for further research.While
it was established that a group of senior officials was involved in the decision
making process by which Report X came to be used to strengthen the
dossier, it remains unclear as to who should accept responsibility for this
process. In addition, it was also noted that, while this article has established
that Report X was used to justify strengthening the claim regarding con-
tinued production of chemical and biological agents, the grounds upon
which the dossier claim regarding Iraqi possession of mobile biological
production facilities was strengthened remain unclear. In all of these cases,
the dossier was strengthened following the 12 September briefing from
Dearlove, when Blair had been briefed about Report X as well as the other
existing human intelligence on Iraqi WMD. Regarding the continued
production claim, a critical question concerns who was driving the decision
making. There are three possibilities. The first is that Dearlove had encour-
aged the use of Report X to strengthen the dossier claims. The second is that
there was mutual agreement among all those concerned. The third possi-
bility is that either Blair or Campbell or both of them pushed for clearance
123Laurie, Written Statement private statement to Chilcot Inquiry, 27 January 2010, accessed at http://
www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/52051/Laurie‐statement‐FINAL.pdf, 15 June 2013.
124Carne Ross, written testimony to Chilcot Inquiry, 12 July 2010, 6–7, accessed at http://www.iraqinquiry.
org.uk/media/47534/carne‐ross‐statement.pdf, 26 May 2013. See also Carne Ross, public oral evidence to
Chilcot Inquiry, 12 July 2010, 6–7, 36–37, 47, 58–60, accessed at http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/
49966/20100712‐ross‐final.pdf, 26 May 2013.
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to use Report X, and that Dearlove then acceded. Regarding the judgment
on the existence of mobile facilities, as shown earlier, there was no new
intelligence following the 9 September JIC assessment which could have
been used to justify the strengthening of this claim. Consequently, one or all
of those involved must have decided to revisit the existing intelligence
regarding mobile facilities, and to then strengthen the dossier claims. Blair
has in fact referred to the existing mobile intelligence as having influenced
him.125 The question raised, again, is whether Blair himself pushed for the
strengthening of the mobile claim, either at the 12 September meeting or
earlier, or whether it was an intelligence‐led decision. Answers to these
questions would provide further insights into the extent to which the
intelligence process was contaminated by political pressure.
More generally, the findings in this paper have implications both for
discussion over organized political persuasion and the currently widely held
thesis that the war against Iraq was a consequence of intelligence failure.
With respect to organized political persuasion, the case study here highlights
how such activities, designed to persuade or promote policy, can lead to
inaccuracy and deception in government communication. This raises critical
questions regarding democratic accountability and the ability of the public
to hold their government to account adequately. For example, in situations
where organized political persuasion leads to a point where the British
PrimeMinister makes statements that are untrue or misleading, it becomes
muchmore difficult for meaningful debate to occur.When a PrimeMinister
is declaring in Parliament that he knows for sure, based upon intelligence,
thatWMD exist in Iraq, journalists are then under strong pressure to accept
the claims being made. This case study provides insights into the reality of
organized political persuasion, and its consequences for democratic com-
munication, which should be further discussed and evaluated.
Regarding the intelligence failure thesis, while there was an intelligence
failure in the sense of a widespread and inaccurate belief among Western
intelligence analysts that Iraq had at least some WMD, this has obscured
deliberate deception by the British government of the public, themedia and
Parliament about the strength of the intelligence, the extent of Iraq’s
capabilities and the threatening nature of those capabilities. This was
not a case of intelligence staff alerting the politicians to a serious threat
and then politicians and their media staff working out how to educate the
public about it and persuade them on the basis of accurate information of
the need for action. Nor did the dossier originate as a response to public or
125Blair, public oral evidence to Chilcot Inquiry, 29 January 2010, 87–88.
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media clamor for information before invading Iraq was high on the agenda.
The impetus was evidently coming from the effort to sway public opinion in
favor of invading Iraq, with the intelligence staff then rooting around trying
to find anything that they could to support that, some of themwillingly. It is
also not the case that there was self‐deception among individuals or collec-
tive misperception in the form of groupthink to misinterpret the intelli-
gence as showing a large, growing or seriously threatening Iraqi WMD
capability. The scrabbling around over many months to find anything to
support a line already decided was intense, widespread and routinely
acknowledged internally as rather fruitless. Presentational experts were
active, central players all the way along, and top intelligence and security
officials were active collaborators in the presentational game.
In the final analysis, whether Blair thought Iraq had WMD seemed less
important to him than his view that SaddamHussein retained the intent to
acquire them given the opportunity, or that if theUnited States was going to
go towar theUK should be in support.126 For Blair, it was a post‐9/11 article
of faith that it was intolerable for Saddam Hussein to have even the
potential to develop WMD which, however improbably, he might pass
on to terrorists. The problem for Blair, aside from the legal one, was that
the British public was unlikely to support war against Iraq to eliminate the
possibility of this highly improbable outcome. As a result, a case for war had
to be built on alleged current capability and danger. The others involved in
the process were mostly focused on giving Blair what he wanted—making
Iraq look as threatening as possible in a way that could more or less
plausibly be defended as intelligence‐based—and they constructed the
deceptive dossier for that purpose.
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